Software TAM
US and international subscription layers · $1.37B with near-term marketplace · band $910M to $1.37B
Operating real estate ecosystem
One record, many readers. It lives with the property forever.
The same asset gets modeled six times by six parties who never reconcile. PATL is the one run they all read from: underwriting, capital and insurance, broker connections, asset management and the data layer, all views of the same record.
The founder underwrote at
Prior experience · not an endorsement



The problem
The broker, the buyer's analyst, the lender's credit team, insurance, investment committee and asset management each build their own. Everyone abandons the model at closing, which is the exact moment it becomes worth something.
40:1deals underwritten for every one that closes
Why it is still unsolved
Real estate investment software was built multifamily-first, which means it models leases. Four asset classes do not have them, and one engine that models a nightly rate serves all four.
The long game
STR, CoStar and NIC MAP know what an asset earned. What anyone believed it would earn is missing, because none of them owns the model. PATL freezes the assumption set, the engine version and the timestamp, then joins them to the realized result years later.
Market
Bottom-up from sourced asset counts, resolved to buying entities rather than buildings: 62,000 US hotels resolve to 17,416 owner entities, alongside 52,300 storage facilities, 28,000 for-profit independent, assisted-living and memory-care senior housing properties and 525,000 professionally managed short-term-rental units. Each class splits into four owner tiers and prices off the same rate card.
Software TAM
US and international subscription layers · $1.37B with near-term marketplace · band $910M to $1.37B
Entry wedge · hotels
Hotels, full stack, US · $468M including international · the class we are in market with today
SAM
Hotels only at current scope · $58M across four classes at R2 scope
Held separately
The data wedge, licensing revenue, excluded from every projection
The broker platform is the smallest layer — the acquisition channel, not the market. Asset management ($352M) and the marketplace ($298M) are both larger than the hotel entry wedge's own subscription line ($131M), the phase-upsell thesis showing up as geometry instead of assertion.
TAM by layer · nothing summed across revenue types without saying so
| Layer | Segment | TAM | Revenue type |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Hotels, US | $131M | Subscription |
| 1b | Hotels, international | $125M | Subscription |
| 2 | Broker OM / listing platform | $34M | Subscription + per listing |
| 3 | Storage, STR, senior housing | $496M | Subscription |
| 5 | Asset management & reporting | $352M | Subscription |
| 4 | Insurance & loan marketplace | $298M | Transaction, unlicensed mechanics |
| 4b | Same, licensed mechanics | $394M | Transaction, month 42+ |
| 6 | Data wedge | $116M | Licensing, held outside projections |
The marketplace is sized three ways — gross flow $83.6B, intermediary fee pool $1.67B, and what PATL can reach with unlicensed mechanics $298M. Only the third figure is in TAM.
The arc
Six phases build the software, and they stand on their own. Four more turn what that software collects into a second business. The sequence only runs one direction: you cannot start at phase eight.
Phase 1 · Software
Hotel engine, extraction, lender or investor package.
Phase 2 · Software
Debt sizing, PIP, deal room. Self storage added.
Phase 3 · Software
Waterfalls, LP portal, management agreement module.
Phase 4 · Software
Variance to underwriting. The spine of everything after.
Phase 5 · Software
Valuation, disposition, buyer offering memorandum.
Phase 6 · Software
Marketplace and the first data products.
Phase 7 · Data
Sponsor underwriting record. Senior housing added.
Phase 8 · Data
Licensed benchmarks per class, including agreement terms.
Phase 9 · Data
API and feeds inside other people's products.
Phase 10 · Data
The taxonomy everyone else measures against.
The software is how we acquire the data, and the data is what makes it hard to replace.
Where to next
Twelve founder-led months, the first paid accounts, and the second asset class. I am customer zero: PivotPt underwrites its own acquisitions on it.